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SPECIAL 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 AND  
GLOBAL ACCESS TO MEDICINES  
 
SEAN M. FLYNN1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since its inception in 1988, the United States Trade Representative’s 
“Special 301” adjudication of foreign intellectual property law standards 
has been used to promote policies restricting access to affordable 
medications around the world. President-elect Obama released a platform 
promising to “break the stranglehold that a few big drug and insurance 
companies have on these life-saving drugs” and pledged support for “the 
rights of sovereign nations to access quality-assured, low-cost generic 
medication to meet their pressing public health needs.” The 2009 and 2010 
Special 301 reports, however, indicate that the Obama Administration has 
not yet implemented this pledge into administration trade policy. Although 
the 2010 Report shows some improvement, the Obama Administration 
continues using Special 301 to pressure developing countries to adopt 
escalating intellectual property rules that are not required by any 
international agreement and that will negatively impact access to medicines.  
 
Keywords: Access to medicine; TRIPS; World Trade Organization; Special 
301; United States Trade Representative; Human Rights; generic medicines; 
public health; Doha Declaration; data exclusivity; linkage; patents; 
intellectual property; Obama Administration 
                                                 
1 Associate Director, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, 
American University Washington College of Law. Harvard Law School (magna cum 
laude) ’99, Pitzer College (Honors) ’92. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1654011































One of the less heralded rituals of spring in Washington, D.C., is the 
unveiling of the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report on the last 
day of April each year. For over two decades the report has functioned as 
one of the primary sticks for the U.S.’s “carrot and stick” approach to 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1654011
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international intellectual property policy. The report weighs countries’ 
compliance with intellectual property standards and enforcements efforts—
both those embedded in existing treaties and those the U.S. would like to 
see adopted. It threatens and rewards countries via inclusion on or delisting 
from its annual ‘Watch List’ (“WL”) and ‘Priority Watch List’ (“PWL”), 
and has the power to implement unilateral trade sanctions when U.S. 
demands are not met. The construction of the report requires the 
administration to take decisions on which countries it views as having 
“adequate” intellectual property protection. The report is thus a key 
expression of the trade policy of the U.S. in intellectual property matters.  
This article examines the history and current use of the Special 301 
program to restrict access to generic medicines in developing countries, 
including in the two reports (in 2009 and 2010) released under the Obama 
Administration. The news for access to medicines advocates is not good on 
the whole. Both Obama Administration reports continue the previous 
administration’s policies of using Special 301 to promote “TRIPS-plus”2 
policies that endanger access to medicines for millions of people around the 
world. These policies violate not only the Obama Administration’s pledges 
to promote access to affordable medications in developing countries, but 
also U.S. commitments and duties under World Trade Organization’s 
dispute settlement understanding, the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, numerous World Health Organization 
resolutions, express Congressional policy, the best interests of the 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the interests of global health 
and international human rights obligations.  
There is a glimmer of hope. The 2009 and 2010 Reports reflect small 
                                                 
2 i.e. policies that go beyond the minimum standards required by the World Trade 
Organization agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
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moves toward a more complete embrace of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health and a gradual de-escalation of some issues that threaten 
access to medicines. But on the whole, the most recent Special 301 Reports 
signal more continuity than change in U.S. policy on trade and access to 
medicines.    
 
A.  Legal and Statutory Background 
The Special 301 program takes its name from, and builds upon the 
administrative structure of, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. That Act 
was passed at a time of large and growing trade deficits, increasing flight of 
manufacturing activities abroad, the rise of Japan as an industrial giant, 
skyrocketing foreign debt and economic crises caused by dependency on 
foreign oil imports, all of which fueled a mood in U.S. policy circles that 
was “decidedly protectionist.”3 U.S. export industries attached considerable 
blame for the U.S. economic woes on the weak enforcement regimes in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the accompanying 
inability of the U.S. to enforce free trade commitments abroad.4 Section 301 
of the Trade Act of 1974 was a key element of the response. The program 
authorized the President to impose economic sanctions on countries that 
“burden or restrict United States commerce.”5 Notably, the law did not 
                                                 
3 PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 85 (2003). 
4 See generally AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM 18-26 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. 
Patrick eds., 1993); Drahos & Braithwaite, supra; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International 
Economic Law 46 (1st ed. 2002) (discussing weak GATT enforcement rules); SUSAN SELL, 
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW:  THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(2003) (discussing the general history of the creation of the WTO). 
5 19 USC 2411(a)-(c) (describing authorized sanctions as including suspension of trade 
agreements, the imposition of tariffs or restrictions on imported goods, and the withdrawal 
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require that the alleged foreign conduct violate any trade agreement with the 
United States to be subject to sanction under the Act.6 
At the urging of the pharmaceutical and copyright industries, Section 
301 was amended in 1984 and 1988 to expand the policy into intellectual 
property. The 1984 amendment established “adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property rights” as grounds for 301 investigation 
and sanctions.7 In 1988, the statute was amended again to create the new 
intellectual property-focused “Special 301” program.  
Under Special 301, the USTR is required to annually publish in the 
Federal Register a list of countries that deny “adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property” or “deny fair and equitable market 
access for U.S. firms that rely on intellectual property,” and then designate 
among those countries the subset of worst actors to be designated “priority 
foreign countries.”8 These requirements resulted in the well-known ‘Watch 
List’ and ‘Priority Watch List,’ which serve as warning mechanisms to 
countries perceived as out of compliance with USTR’s preferences on IP 
policy. Designation as a ‘Priority Foreign Country,’ triggers a 30-day 
countdown during which targeted countries must “(enter) into good faith 
negotiations” or “(make) significant progress in bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations” or face sanctions determinations under the Section 301 
process.9 Priority foreign country determinations are reserved for countries 
                                                                                                                            
of Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”) benefits for developing countries). 
6 See LESLIE ALAN GLICK, GUIDE TO UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND TRADE LAWS 
AFTER THE CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION ACT 150 (3rd Ed. 2008).  
7 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II). 
8 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (listing identification criteria); see also, § 2242(e) (requiring 
Trade Representative to publish a list in the Federal Register). 
9 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(C) (specifying that “In identifying priority foreign countries 
under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the Trade Representative shall only identify those 
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“that have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices,”10 that 
“have the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant 
United States products,”11 and for which “there is a factual basis for the 
denial of fair and equitable market access as a result.”12 
Special 301 findings are, by intent and definition, unilateral findings by 
the U.S. and subject to U.S. standards.13 As in the original Section 301, 
foreign practices and policies do not have to contravene any trade 
agreement with the United States to be found “unreasonable.”14 Nor must 
the U.S. take into account a country’s level of economic development in 
determining what is fair or unfair—a sharp departure from GATT rules 
promoting differential treatment for developing countries.15 
1. 1984-1994   
The first use of Section 301 unilateral sanction authority in an 
intellectual property case followed the 1984 amendments listing a lack of 
adequate intellectual property protection as a potential ground for a 301 
action. The Reagan Administration made quick use of the new powers by 
                                                                                                                            
foreign countries that are not entering into good faith negotiations, or making significant 
progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations.” (emphasis added)). 
10 19 USC 2242(b)(1)(A) 
11 19 USC 2242(b)(1)(B) 
12 19 USC 2242(b)(3) 
13 See LESLIE ALAN GLICK, GUIDE TO UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND TRADE LAWS 
AFTER THE CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION ACT 150-51 (3rd Ed. 2008) (explaining the “great 
deal of discretion” USTR has to define infringements). 
14 Id. 
15 See Hesham Youssef, Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries 
in the WTO, SOUTH CENTRE TRADE-RELATED AGENDA, DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY 
(T.R.A.D.E.) WORKING PAPERS No. 2 (1999), available at 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=283%3Asp
ecial-and-differential-treatment-for-developing-countries-in-the-wto&Itemid=1&lang=en 
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launching investigations of two industrializing nations with histories of 
infant-industry protection: Korea and Brazil. Each case ultimately led to 
new intellectual property laws being passed in the targeted countries, 
marking the strategy as a huge success in industry perception.    
A 1985 action against Brazil pressed for changes in Brazil’s informatics 
policy. The U.S. alleged that Brazil failed to adequately protect copyrights 
in computer software, as part of a broader attack on Brazil’s national import 
substitution policy favoring domestically produced computers and software. 
At the time, there was no bilateral or multilateral agreement binding Brazil 
to grant copyrights on software. But the U.S. threats were successful in 
pressuring Brazil to alter its policy in 1988, when Brazil amended its 
copyright law to include computer software protection and pledged to phase 
out its local purchasing preferences.16  
A second complaint in 1987 concerned Brazil’s lack of pharmaceutical 
product patent protection. At least 50 other countries denied patents for 
pharmaceuticals at the same time period,17 and Brazil was not required to 
grant pharmaceutical patents by any bilateral or multilateral commitment 
binding it.18 Nevertheless, the U.S. carried forward its 301 complaint and 
used its unilateral authority to impose trade sanctions on Brazil until it 
                                                 
16 THOMAS BAYARD & KIMBERLY ELLIOT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN US TRADE 
POLICY 189 (1994). 
17 See Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents, 
Developing a Public Health Perspective, WHO, ICTSD, UNCTAD WORKING PAPER 
(January 2007) (noting that at least 50 countries lacked pharmaceutical patents prior to the 
initiation of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations in 1986).  
18 See generally Kumariah Balasubramaniam, Pharmaceutical Patents in Developing 
Countries: Policy Options, 22 ECON. & POLITICAL WEEKLY 103-120 (1987) (explaining 
lack of international obligations on scope of patents at the time). 
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changed its law.19 Brazil responded with a GATT suit challenging the 
legality of the unilateral retaliation.20 The GATT complaint was never 
adjudicated, however, because the U.S. blocked the formation of a dispute 
settlement panel. Sanctions were ultimately lifted in 1990 when a new 
Brazilian president promised to revise its law to provide pharmaceutical 
patents.21 
A 1985 301 case against Korea also included complaints about Korea’s 
lack of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. That complaint ultimately 
ended with a bilateral agreement with the US on intellectual property. The 
agreement required Korea to amend its copyright and patent laws, creating 
what one negotiator described as a “blueprint for other agreements,” 
including TRIPS.22 
The Special 301 program creating watch lists for intellectual property 
was created in 1988, during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations that 
ultimately produced the TRIPS agreement. During those early years, the US 
government used Special 301 to pressure countries to accept TRIPS and to 
punish dissenters.23 The US placed many of the leading countries opposing 
                                                 
19 See Bayard & Elliott, supra, at187-193. (noting that U.S. imposed duties on 
imported Brazilian goods cost Brazil approximately $39 million); see also § 19 USC 
2411(a)(3) (stating that penalties under Section 301are supposed to “be devised so as to 
affect goods or services of the foreign country in an amount that is equivalent in value to 
the burden or restriction being imposed by that country on United States commerce.”). 
20 Id. 
21 See id.; Brazil-U.S. Dispute Set For GATT, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/22/business/brazil-us-dispute-set-for-gatt.html. 
22 Drahos & Braithwaite, supra , at 103. 
23 See Donald Harris, The Honeymoon is Over: The US-China WTO Intellectual 
Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 101 (2008) [hereinafter Harris I]; see also 
Donald Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27 U. PA. 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 681, 735 (2006) [hereinafter Harris II] (explaining that in 1992, US 
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TRIPS in the first Special 301 Report in 1989, including Brazil, India, 
Argentina, and Egypt.24 Two years later, India, China and Thailand became 
the first countries to grace the Priority Foreign Countries listing, triggering 
section 301 investigations. Brazil was sanctioned with a loss of GSP 
benefits in 1988; Thailand lost them in 1989; and India in 1992—all on 
matters related to pharmaceutical patents. None of the countries were in 
derogation of any multilateral or bilateral commitment with the U.S. 
Through these years, the credible threat of sanction appeared to be the 
driving policy choice motivating the program. Foreign countries had a great 
deal to lose from US sanctions that limited access to the broad US market. 
And because 301 sanctions were determined unilaterally, there was little 
countries could do to influence the process and resist its negative 
determination. Accepting the regime shift of intellectual property matters 
into the multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO) became one strategy 
of developing countries to get rid of Special 301’s unilateral threats and 
sanctions.25 But that strategy failed.  
2. 1994-2008 
The passage of the WTO’s agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)26 secured most of the substantive goals 
on intellectual property policy that the USTR had pursued in the 1980s. 
Through TRIPS, the WTO included a broad array of minimum intellectual 
                                                                                                                            
suspended India’s GSP benefits (valued at $60 million). India’s resolves was weakened in 
opposing the TRIPS, in light of a pragmatic issue of retaining good trade relations with the 
US). 
24 See Harris II, supra , at 735. 
25 See Bayard & Elliot, at 207. 
26 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Annex 1C, art. 8, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
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property standards for every member, including product and process patents 
in every field of technology. And perhaps most importantly, it resolved 
longstanding U.S. complaints about the lack of enforcement procedures in 
GATT by establishing a formal and binding dispute resolution process 
which could authorize trade sanctions for violations.27 The dispute 
settlement provision came with a prohibition on the kind of unilateral 
adjudication previously effected under Section 301 and Special 301. Article 
23.2 of the WTO agreement provides: “Members shall not make a 
determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have 
been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the 
covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute 
settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this 
understanding.”28 It was thus thought by many developing countries that the 
enactment of TRIPS would spell the demise of Special 301.  
The creation of the WTO did not end Special 301. Instead, Congress 
amended the Trade Act to specify that “[a] foreign country may be 
determined to deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights, notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in 
compliance with the specific obligations” of TRIPS.29 Although the legality 
of this continuation of Special 301 under the WTO is open to question, as 
described below, continue it did. 
 
                                                 
27 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter 
DSU]. 
28 DSU Article 23(2) 23.2(a), Annex 2, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
29 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242(d)(4). 
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The above chart shows the number of countries placed on the Watch 
List, Priority Watch List, and Priority Foreign Country listings before and 
after the establishment of the WTO.30 What is notable is that the number of 
countries identified on Special 301 watch lists steadily increased in the 
post-WTO years while the number of countries designated as PFCs, and 
therefore under the most immediate threat of economic sanctions, dropped 
off dramatically. Only three countries were designated as PFCs after 1994: 
China in 1996, Paraguay in 1998, and Ukraine in 2001-05. Of these, only 
Paraguay was a member of the WTO in the year it was listed as a PFC.31  
The increasing use of watch lists and decreasing use of PFC 
designations reflect a shift in the primary mechanism of coercion under 
Special 301. Whereas in the pre-1994 period the US appeared to be relying 
on a credible threat of sanctions as its main tool to promote compliance with 
its wishes, after the WTO the main tool of persuasion was “to give countries 
the feeling that their behavior on intellectual property was the subject of 
                                                 
30 Research by Mike Palmedo, American University Washington College of Law 
Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (2010). 
31 Argentina (WTO member since 1995) was identified as PFC in 1994 (prior to WTO 
establishment), but US sanctions against Argentina became effective in 1996 (50% GSP 
reduction). 
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constant surveillance.”32 For this purpose, it was more important to list 
many countries as subject to the watchful gaze of USTR than it was to 
actually impose sanctions. 
3. Special 301 as a Violation of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding 
The reduction of PFC determinations likely reflected concerns about the 
legality of unilaterally imposing economic sanctions on foreign countries 
within the WTO framework. Indeed, in 1999, a WTO Dispute Settlement 
Panel reviewed the use of Section 301 in non-IP cases and held that the U.S. 
could not use 301 to impose unilateral trade sanctions without going 
through the WTO dispute settlement process.33 Similarly, unilateral 
sanctions imposed under Special 301 would appear to be a clear violation of 
the WTO agreement.  
The continued use of Special 301 watch lists after the establishment of 
the WTO evidences a conclusion by the U.S. that watch lists do not 
implicate the multilateral dispute resolution mandate. This conclusion is far 
from clear, however. By its plain terms, the dispute settlement 
understanding is not limited to a ban on unilateral imposition of economic 
sanctions, but rather extends to a prohibition of any member making “a 
determination to the effect that a violation has occurred.”34 Under U.S. law, 
the Special 301 process is an administrative adjudication – it is a rule bound 
procedure for determining whether other country laws are consistent with a 
statutory standard.35 The statutory standard includes determinations as to 
                                                 
32 Drahos & Braithwaite, supra, at 100. 
33 Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.89, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report]. 
34 DSU, supra. 
35 See Administrative Procedures Act 5 U.S.C. §551(7) (defining “adjudication” as any 
“agency process for the formulation of an order” determining rights and responsibilities 
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whether foreign country laws “violate provisions of international law or 
international agreements to which both the United States and the foreign 
country are parties.”36 In the results of Special 301 adjudications, USTR 
frequently determines that countries are in violation of U.S. interpretations 
of the TRIPS agreement, for example in failing to adopt “data exclusivity” 
regulations as the means for implementation of TRIPS Article 39.3. As 
such, the process appears to violate the WTO dispute settlement understand 
both facially and as applied.  
There is also basis in WTO jurisprudence for seeing the Watch Lists 
themselves as trade barriers. In the 1999 dispute settlement decision on 
Section 301, the WTO panel explained that the “threat alone” of unilateral 
sanctions outside the dispute settlement process risks undermining the basic 
principle of WTO legitimacy:  
Members faced with a threat of unilateral action, especially when it 
emanates from an economically powerful Member, may in effect be forced to 
give in to the demands imposed by the Member exerting the threat... To put it 
differently, merely carrying a big stick is, in many cases, as effective a means 
to having one's way as actually using the stick. The threat alone of conduct 
prohibited by the WTO would enable the Member concerned to exert undue 
leverage on other Members.  It would disrupt the very stability and 
equilibrium which multilateral dispute resolution was meant to foster and 
consequently establish, namely equal protection of both large and small, 
powerful and less powerful Members through the consistent application of a 
set of rules and procedures.”37  
This language in the panel decision appears to be a shot across the bow 
                                                                                                                            
based on past conduct). The adjudication is “informal” because the governing statute does 
not require that the process be “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,” 
which would trigger heightened procedural protections. Id. at §554(a) 
36 19 U.S.C. § 2242(d)(3). 
37 Section 301 Panel Report, supra. 
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of the Special 301 Watch Lists, but no member has brought a challenge 
against the program in the WTO yet. 
 
B.  Special 301 and Access to Medicines 
1. Use of Special 301 to Promote TRIPS-Plus Policies  
During the negotiation of the TRIPS agreement, concerns about its 
impact on access to medicines were a primary issue for many countries. 
Pharmaceutical patents grant monopoly rights to patent holders, allowing 
them to charge much higher prices than would be possible in a competitive 
environment. That effect is justified by the assertion that a portion of those 
excess profits would be directed toward research and development of new 
medicines. But increased prices also limit access to affordable medications. 
This effect is most pronounced in developing countries with high income 
inequality where monopolies on medicines predictably lead to profit 
maximizing pricing that will exclude the great majority from access while 
providing miniscule incentive for future innovation.38  
In recognition of the unbalanced costs and benefits of intellectual 
property, particularly with respect to medicines, it is commonly accepted 
that intellectual property rules for medicines should differ among 
countries.39 A one-size-fits-all intellectual property norm was emphatically 
                                                 
38 Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Mike Palmedo, An Economic Justification for Open 
Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184 
(2009). 
39 See, e.g., Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating 
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, 155 (2002); Report of the 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Intellectual Property and Development, 
Lessons from Recent Economic Research, 215 (Carsten Fink & Keith E.Maskus eds., 
2005); Joseph Stiglitz, Intellectual-Property Rights and Wrongs, available at 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz61/English.  
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rejected in the WTO negotiations. TRIPS contains minimum standards for 
patents and other forms of intellectual property for all countries. But the 
agreement contains important flexibilities that can and should be used to 
tailor the contours of intellectual property protection to public health and 
other public interests.40 Primary among the TRIPS flexibilities supporting 
access to medicines are:  
• Compulsory licenses. TRIPS protects the authority to grant 
a compulsory license or government use order for any 
patented product for any reason, subject only to the 
procedural and adequate compensation requirements of Art. 
31;  
• Scope of patentability. Countries have freedom to define 
the scope of patentable subject matter through legislative or 
policy definitions of the criteria that inventions be “new,” 
“involve an inventive step,” and are “capable of industrial 
application,” (Art. 27), including by rejecting patents for 
minor improvements or new uses of known products; 
• Parallel importation. Countries may define “exhaustion of 
rights” for intellectual property to allow parallel importation 
of intellectual property protected products between 
countries; 
• 20 year patents. Countries may limit patents to 20 years 
(Art. 28), with no extensions for new uses of existing 
products or for problems of regulatory delay; 
• Freedom from patent-registration “linkage.” Countries 
                                                 
40 See TRIPS, supra, Art.8 (expressing the overriding principles that countries remain 
free to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health” and to take measures “to 
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights”). 
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are not required to implement any “linkage” between the 
drug registration and assertions of patent protection, which 
can permit improper use of the registration system by patent 
holders to delay legitimate generic entry into a market; 
• Flexible data protection. Countries are not required to 
adopt U.S. or EU-style “data exclusivity” as the form of 
protection for undisclosed information under Art. 39.3, 
thereby avoiding the grant of marketing monopolies for 
medicines that operate independently of patent status; 
• Freedom of regulation. Countries remain free to use other 
regulatory systems, including competition policies, 
reimbursement formularies and price regulations, to restrain 
excessive pricing by patent holders, in particular “to protect 
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest 
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.” (Art. 8).  
In the post-TRIPS years, Special 301 was used to press countries to 
limit every one of the access to medicines flexibilities noted above. The 
trend began in the Clinton Administration when, soon after the passage of 
TRIPS, the U.S. used Special 301 to pressure South Africa to give up 
statutory authorization for parallel importation and Brazil to restrict the 
grounds for which it authorized compulsory licenses.41 In each case, the 
countries were attempting to use these flexibilities to promote access to 
generic AIDS drugs. These measures were in large part responsible for an 
outpouring of international outrage. Health advocates in the U.S., South 
Africa and Brazil took the streets and, in the U.S., protested at Gore 
                                                 
41 See Section 301 Panel Report, supra. 
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presidential campaign rallies.42 The pressure led the Clinton Administration 
to announce a new policy on access to medicines in December 1999.  
The new policy of the Clinton Administration included an executive 
order banning TRIPS-plus pharmaceuticals pressure on any Sub-Saharan 
African country.43 It also included a notable change in the Special 301 
program. The 2000 Special 301 report explained: 
The Administration has made clear that the final choice of what policies 
to employ [to promote access to medicines] is one for each government to 
make on its own. Should a government avail itself of the flexibility the WTO 
TRIPS agreement provides to address a health care crisis, the United States 
will raise no objection.44  
For a short moment in U.S. trade policy, it appeared that access to 
medicines advocates had obtained a significant victory over the use of 
Special 301 to promote restrictions on access to medicines. But the 
Administration soon changed hands.  
One of the Bush Administration’s first acts on international intellectual 
property policy was to assent to the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
                                                 
42 See ELLEN F. M. ‘T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY 
POWER DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION OF THE WTO DOHA 
DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2009); Susan Sell, TRIPS and the Access to 
Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481 (2002); Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange 
TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property 
Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1069 (1996). 
43 Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 10, 2000). 
44 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Releases 
Super 301, Special 301 and Title VII Reports (May 1, 2000) available at, 
http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uploads/images/YXuL_DZ9fkSv3SDt1zgbMg/usinfo_30
1_00-30.pdf. 
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Agreement and Public Health.45 That declaration, instigated by the African 
Group in response to the Clinton administration’s use of Special 301 and 
other trade pressure in South Africa and Brazil, affirmed the “the right of 
WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, 
which provide flexibility” to “promote access to medicines for all.”46 But 
Bush’s USTR soon turned face on that commitment, vigorously pursuing 
trade agreements and trade pressure aimed at promoting TRIPS-plus 
policies on pharmaceuticals in developing countries.47 Special 301 was used 
to press countries to limit grounds for compulsory licenses, restrict freedom 
to define the scope of patentability, prohibit parallel importation, extend 
patents beyond 20 years, implement “linkage” between drug registration 
and assertions of patent protection, adopt U.S. or EU-style “data 
exclusivity” rules, and do away with evidence-based formularies and other 
price and competition restrictions on pharmaceutical monopoly power. The 
administration justified these pressures in spite of its international 
commitments with the assertion that “IP rights ultimately enhance public 
health . . . and that therefore this approach is consistent with the Doha 
                                                 
45 See t’Hoen supra, see also Sell, supra, Weissman, A Long Strange Trips,  supra. 
46 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 755, ¶ 4 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (emphasis 
added); see Carlos Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the Trips Agreement 
and Public Health, Health Economics and Drugs Series, No. 012, WHO (2002) available 
at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js2301e/ (discussing the legal implications of the 
Doha Declaration). 
47 See United States House of Representatives, Committee On Government Reform – 
Minority Staff, Special Investigations Division, Trade Agreements and Access To 
Medications Under The Bush Administration, Prepared For Rep. Henry A. Waxman 
[hereinafter Waxman Report] (June 2005); Robert Weissman, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in 
Trade Agreements: Consequences for Public Health (Essential Action, Working Paper), 
available at http://www.essentialaction.org/access/uploads/tripsplusprovisions.doc. 
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Declaration.”48  
2. Public Health Criticism of TRIPS-Plus Policies 
TRIPS-plus pressure to restrict access to medicines in the Bush 
Administration was widely condemned by domestic and international 
experts and officials.  
a. The World Health Organization 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has long urged developing 
countries to “be cautious about enacting legislation that is more stringent 
than the TRIPS requirements.”49 Its 2006 major report on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health admonished that “Bilateral 
trade agreements should not seek to incorporate TRIPS-plus protection in 
ways that may reduce access to medicines in developing countries.”50 In 
2008, after more than two years of negotiation, all the WHO Member 
States, including the U.S., adopted by consensus the historic resolution 
WHA 61.21 containing a Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property.51 Through the Plan of Acton, 
                                                 
48 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters: U.S. 
Trade Policy Guidance on WTO Declaration on Access to Medicines May Need 
Clarification, Publication No. GAO-07-1198 at 28 (2007) [hereinafter GAO Access 
Report] (quoting administration officials). 
49 See WHO, Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharmaceuticals, 
WHO/EDM/2001.2 at 4-5 (Mar. 2001) (stating “Poorer populations in developing countries 
should not be expected to pay the same price as do the wealthy for newer essential drugs. 
TRIPS-compliant mechanisms can be used to lower drug prices.”). 
50 WHO, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and 
Public Health, at 145 (Apr. 2006) [hereinafter 2006 CIPIH Report] 
51 WHO, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property of the Sixty-first World Health Assembly, WHA61.21, element 5.2.c, 
(May 24, 2008) [hereinafter Global Strategy and Plan of Action] available at 
www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf. 
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the U.S. agreed “to take into account in trade agreements the flexibilities 
contained in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights and including those recognized by the Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted by the WTO Ministerial 
Conference and the WTO decision of 30 August 2003.”52 
b. UN Human Rights Bodies  
U.S. trade pressure on medicines attracted the attention of UN human 
rights bodies. Promoting access to affordable medicines for the poor is a 
widely recognized human rights duty emanating from the recognition of 
civil and political as well as social and economic rights that bind the United 
States.53 Health and social policies which increase mortality and morbidity 
implicate the right to life in Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights54 as well as Articles 22 and 25.1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.55 States are bound to protect the rights to life 
and health not only of their own citizens, but also of the citizens of other 
countries affected by their foreign policy, trade and assistance programs.56  
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health, ¶ 2, E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).  
54 See The Right to Life, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, 
at Gen. Comment No. 6, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982); Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Peru, ¶¶ 13, 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.72 (1996).  
55 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights] (noting that Art. 
22 protects “the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the 
free development of his personality”; Art. 25 protects “the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health of himself and of his family, including . . . medical care and 
necessary social services.”). 
56 See id. at arts. 22, 28 (requiring “national effort and international cooperation” and 
noting that “[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
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UN human rights officials and bodies have repeatedly affirmed that the 
globalization of intellectual property rights can only be squared with human 
rights concerns if countries are permitted and encouraged to utilize the full 
scope of intellectual property exceptions and limitations provided for in the 
TRIPS agreement.57 Examining the human rights duties of states to take 
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities to promote access to medicines has been a 
frequent subject of human rights treaty monitoring bodies.58 Such reviews 
                                                                                                                            
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”); see also U.N. Charter arts. 
55-56 (calling on members to take “joint and several action” to promote “a higher standard 
of living,” “solutions of international economic, social health and related problems,” and 
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights”); see CONSTITUTION OF THE 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Preamble (July 22, 1946), 62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 
(declaring the “health of all peoples” as “dependent upon the fullest co-operation of 
individuals and States”). 
57 See U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and 
Mental Health, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/12 (Mar. 31, 2009) (prepared by Anand 
Grover); UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, ¶ 63, U.N. 
Doc. A/63/263 (Aug. 11, 2008); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Human Rights 
and Intellectual Property: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 27th Sess., ¶ 12, U.N 
Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001); ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner: The Impact of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, ¶¶ 
27-28, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001). Cf. UNHCR, Commission on Human 
Rights Resolution: Access to medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, E/CN.4/2003/29 (Apr. 22, 2003). 
58 See UNHCR, Comm. On the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: 
Thailand, ¶ 58(f), CRC/C/THA/CO/2 (March 17, 2006) (admonishing Thailand to 
“[e]nsure that regional and other free trade agreements do not have a negative impact on 
the enjoyment of the right to health”); UNHCR, Comm. On the Rights of the Child, 
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have included analysis of the duties of wealthy countries to promote the use 
of TRIPS flexibilities in their trade and assistance relations with poor 
countries.59 This body of human rights law was summarized by Special 
Rapporteur Paul Hunt as meaning that “that no rich State should encourage 
a developing country to accept intellectual property standards that do not 
take into account the safeguards and flexibilities included under the TRIPS 
Agreement. In other words, developed States should not encourage a 
developing country to accept ‘TRIPS-plus’ standards.”60 
c. U.S. Congress 
Members of Congress frequently criticized the Bush Administration’s 
TRIPS-plus trade pressure on pharmaceuticals. The Kennedy Amendment 
                                                                                                                            
Concluding Observations: Peru, ¶¶ 48-49, CRC/C/PER/CO/3 (March 14, 2006); UNHCR, 
Comm. On the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Ecuador, Concluding 
Observations, ¶ 21, CRC/C/15/Add.262 (Sept. 13, 2005); UNHCR, Comm. On the Rights 
of the Child, Concluding Observations: Nicaragua, ¶ 16, CRC/C/15/Add.265 (Sept. 21, 
2005); UNHCR, Comm. On the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: 
Philippines, ¶ 59, CRC/C/15/Add.259 (June 3, 2005) (recommending that the State use “all 
the flexibilities reaffirmed by the Doha Declaration . . . to ensure access to affordable 
medicines”); UNHCR, Comm. On the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: 
Chile, ¶ 59, E/C.12/1/Add.105 (Nov. 26, 2004) (encouraging Chile “to provide greater 
access to generic medicine making use of the flexibility clauses permitted in [TRIPS]”); 
UNHCR, Comm. On the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Ecuador, ¶ 55, 
E/C.12/1/Add.100 (June 7, 2004) (“strongly urges the State party . . . to make extensive use 
of the flexibility clauses permitted in [TRIPS] in order to ensure access to generic 
medicine”); UNHCR, Comm. On the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: 
Botswana, ¶ 20, CRC/C/15/Add.242 (Nov. 3, 2004); UNHCR, Comm. On the Rights of the 
Child, Concluding Observations: El Salvador, ¶¶ 47-48, CRC/C/15/Add.232 (June 30, 
2004); UNHCR, Comm. On the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Uganda,,  
CCPR/CO/80/UGA (May 4, 2004). 
59 See Denmark, Summary Record, E/C.12/2004/SR.37, ¶ 7 (16 November 2004). 
60 Paul Hunt, Report to the General Assembly, ¶ 63, A/61/338 (13 September 2006). 
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to the 2002 Trade Promotion Authority legislation, requiring trade policy to 
respect the Doha Declaration, was intended to block TRIPS-plus trade 
pressure on medicines.61 In June 2005, the Committee on Government 
Reform reported that TRIPS-plus provisions on pharmaceuticals are 
“[c]ontrary to the principles of the Doha Declaration,” because they “will 
significantly impede the ability of developing countries to obtain access to 
inexpensive, lifesaving medications.”62  
In the end of 2006, control of Congress shifted to the Democratic Party. 
The inclusion of Thailand and Brazil on the 2007 Special 301 watch lists for 
using compulsory licensing was criticized by dozens of Democratic 
Members of Congress for sending “a troubling message” to the “whole 
world . . . that the exercise of recognized public health flexibilities in trade 
obligations is frowned on by the United States.”63 Soon after, in May 2007, 
a bipartisan group of congressional leaders and the Bush Administration 
negotiated a “New Trade Policy for America,” which limited pending trade 
agreement provisions on data exclusivity and excluded from the agreements 
requirements for linkage and patent extensions.64 The same year, resolutions 
were introduced in the Senate and House calling on the USTR to “honor” 
the Doha Declaration’s affirmation of the rights “to use ‘to the full’ the 
flexibilities” in TRIPS and “not place countries on the ‘Special 301' Priority 
                                                 
61 See Consumer Project on Technology, Trade Promotion Authority and HIV/AIDS, 
available at, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/trade/kennedy.html 
62 Waxman Report, supra, at ii. 
63 Letter from Rep. Henry Waxman, United States House of Representatives, et. al. to 
The Honorable Susan Schwab, United States Trade Representative (Jun. 20, 2007), 
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Watch List . . . for exercising the flexibilities on public health provided for 
in the TRIPS Agreement.”65  
d. The interest of PEPFAR 
TRIPS-plus trade pressures on access to medicines have always stood in 
uneasy tension with U.S. foreign aid goals to increase treatment of people 
with AIDS in developing countries. The U.S. is a major purchaser of 
antiretroviral and other medicines for people living with HIV/AIDS through 
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).66 In 2007, 
73% of all antiretroviral drugs delivered by PEPFAR were generics, saving 
PEPFAR $64 million.67 President Bush, in announcing his PEPFAR 
initiative, directly referenced the low-cost of generic medicines as enabling 
PEPFAR’s scale up,68 even while his USTR was annually producing 301 
                                                 
65 S.Res. 241, 110th Cong. (2007); H.Res. 525, 110th Cong. (2007). See also Letter 
from Rep. Henry Waxman, United States House of Representatives, et. al. to The 
Honorable Susan Schwab, United States Trade Representative (Apr. 9, 2008), available at 
http://waxman.house.gov/UploadedFiles/letter_special_301__04-09-08.pdf (urging that in 
Special 301 “countries should not be cited for the use of compulsory licenses or other 
flexibilities in accordance with international trade rules”). 
66 See Press Release, The White House, Presidential Statement on the Global Health 
Initiative (May 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Global-
Health-Initiative/ (last visited Jul. 1, 2010) (describing the President’s global AIDS 
program as guided by the principle that “[t]he world is interconnected, and that demands an 
integrated approach to global health” that supports “the health and dignity of people 
everywhere”). 
67 OFFICE OF THE U.S. GLOBAL AIDS COORDINATOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS: FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PEPFAR (Feb. 
2008), available at http://www.pepfar.gov/press/fourth_annual_report/ (last visited Jul. 1, 
2010). 
68 See Press Release, President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, Increasing the 
Availability of Safe, Effective, Low-Cost Generic Medications (Jan. 2009), available at 
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reports and trade agreements working counter to this goal.  
C.  Special 301 in the Obama Administration 
The Obama campaign for the presidency reached out to access to 
medicines campaigners to join the broad coalition he was building to gain 
the presidency. In response to their concerns, he declared that his 
presidency would “break the stranglehold that a few big drug and insurance 
companies have on these life-saving drugs,” and pledged support for “the 
rights of sovereign nations to access quality-assured, low-cost generic 
medication to meet their pressing public health needs under the WTO’s 
Declaration on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).”69 The Obama administration has now produced two Special 301 
reports cataloguing its policies on intellectual property and access to 
medicines. As detailed below, the administration receives low marks on its 
commitments thus far.   
1. Procedural reform 
The most notable change in Special 301 under the Obama 
administration may be in the area of procedural reform. But even here, the 
change has been extremely modest. 
USTR reviews the IP policies of a huge number of countries every year. 
The 2010 report states that the laws and policies of 77 countries were 
reviewed through “extensive research and analysis.”70 The bulk of the work 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.pepfar.gov/press/108120.htm (last visited Jul. 1, 2010) (claiming PEPFAR 
“supports the increased availability of safe, effective, low-cost, and generic antiretroviral 
drugs (ARVs) in the developing world…”). 
69 Press Release, The Office of the President – Elect, The Obama-Biden Plan to 
Combat Global HIV/AIDS, available at  
http://change.gov/pages/the_obama_biden_plan_to_combat_global_hiv_aids (last visited 
Jul. 1, 2010). 
70 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
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is done in a roughly four month window between January and April of each 
year. During that period, a great number of technical factual and legal 
determinations must be made, including the statutory mandates that the 
review distinguish countries “that have the most onerous or egregious acts, 
policies, or practices,”71 that “have the greatest adverse impact (actual or 
potential) on the relevant United States products,”72 and for which “there is 
a factual basis for the denial of fair and equitable market access as a 
result.”73 USTR has few dedicated staff to this effort,74 and lacks the 
necessary legal, economic, and other experts to independently research and 
analyze the world’s intellectual property policies and their economic effect 
on US trade interests. The agency therefore relies largely on an 
administrative comment process to provide the factual material required.75 
Construction of the Special 301 report has always attracted a great deal 
of attention from the brand name pharmaceutical industry. The 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) annually 
submits hundreds of pages of detailed allegations about the intellectual 
property and pharmaceutical policies of countries around the globe and 
delineates those it wishes to be targeted for threats of sanctions. PhRMA 
regularly targets countries for the failure to enact U.S.-style intellectual 
property and data protection standards or for having reimbursement 
                                                                                                                            
PRESIDENT, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, at 3 (Apr. 30, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Special 301 
Report]. 
71 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(A). 
72 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(B) 
73 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(3) 
74 USTR Office of Intellectual Property and Innovation has a total of 8 staff, as verified 
over a phone inquiry on October 9, 2009. 
75 Drahos & Braithwaite, supra, at 94 (describing USTR’s “symbiotic” reliance on 
industry submissions). 
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formularies that consider cost or promote generic medicines. PhRMA 
generally gets its way. Of the 48 countries PhRMA requested to be included 
in watch lists in 2008, 36, or 75%, of the requests were honored by USTR. 
For the most part, PhRMA findings and recommendations simply pass 
through into USTR’s Special 301 Report. 
In the past, it was exceedingly rare for pharmaceutical policy interests 
other than PhRMA to make their voice heard in the Special 301 process. 
Part of this has been by design. Reflecting a desire at the time to increase 
industry input into trade policy, the Special 301 statute requires USTR to 
“take into account information from such sources as may be available to the 
Trade Representative and such information as may be submitted to the 
Trade Representative by interested persons.”76 Although “interested 
persons” may include targeted countries or non-governmental 
organizations, in practice, USTR has sought and received input almost 
exclusively from industry. This too appears to be by design. For example, 
the 2009 request for comments focuses on requests for information on 
“problems experienced,” rather than for all information needed to reach a 
balanced decision. 
If the goal of the comment period was to solicit a full record of differing 
views and information to adjudicate between them, then one would expect 
an adversarial process in which notice and opportunities to be heard would 
be structured for targeted countries and their allies (e.g. “friend of the court” 
submissions from public interest organizations) to respond. Yet, until 2008, 
the process effectively made replies to the industry complaints impossible, 
as all comments were due on the same day. Presently, countries (but not 
non-state parties allied to them) are given two weeks of additional time to 
submit comments after industry submissions are received. That change 
                                                 
76 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(2)(B) 
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appears to have led to a dramatic increase of country submissions in the 
process – from a norm of 3 or 4 per year to over 20 in 2009 and 2010. 
In 2010, for the first time, the USTR held an open public hearing 
(limited to participants physically present in the U.S.) as part of its report 
preparation process. The hearing was a response to the requests of global 
health groups that the Obama Administration change previous policies and 
processes that affect access to medicines. As shown in the table below, this 
small step toward more openness dramatically changed the range of parties 
participating in the process. In previous years there were never more than 
60 submissions to USTR about Special 301, half of which were generally 
industry submissions and the other half (in recent years) from foreign 
countries. But in 2010 the number of submissions ballooned to over 500, 
nearly 90% of which were from individuals or public interest organizations 
opposed to the current direction of U.S. trade policy.77 In the open hearing, 
the large majority of participants were representing public health 
organizations requesting change in administration policy that negatively 
impacts access to medicines.  
                                                 
77 See Submissions Concerning Special 301, www.regulation.gov (choose “Read 
Comments” then enter “USTR 2010-0003” in “Keyword or ID”).  
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   2007 2008 2009  2010
Companies and industry 
groups 
21 19 30  37
Countries on previous 
301 lists 
4 3 24  25
Individuals and small 
businesses 
0 2 1  441
Nonprofits  1 0 0  26
 
 
Although the process improved in 2010, the hearing procedure 
implemented by USTR remains severely flawed from an administrative 
justice standpoint. In a regular regulatory review process, a draft regulation 
or report is released and comments are requested on its contents. After the 
comments, the agency is normally compelled to explain its decision 
between opposing comments, thus demonstrating that any choices between 
opposing views have some rational basis. The 301 process lacks these basic 
procedural norms. Comments are invited on a notice, not a draft. And the 
final report that was issued in 2010 failed to respond to any of the factual 
and legal disputes before it. State and public health advocates submitted a 
list of 13 legal and factual disputes that they requested responses to. These 
included assertions that Special 301 violates the WTO Agreement, that 
USTR’s interpretation of TRIPS article 39.3 as requiring data exclusivity is 
legally erroneous, that TRIPS-plus pressure on access to medicines violates 
U.S. international commitments, and that the Special 301 statute does not 
authorize the pursuit of substantive restrictions on nondiscriminatory 
reimbursement, competition or pricing policies. USTR’s 2010 report does 
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not respond to any of these allegations of unlawful administrative action.  
One of the hallmarks of a just and fair administrative process is an 
avenue for appealing questions of law, policy, and erroneous findings of 
fact to an independent authority. Indeed, this procedural protection is being 
demanded by USTR for pharmaceutical pricing programs abroad, but is not 
given in the Special 301 process that is used to make such demands. 
Administrative options for such an appeal could be established to a body 
housed in the State Department’s Office of General Counsel or the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. For example, questions about 
interpretation of whether Special 301 violates the WTO agreement, 
international human rights obligations, and the Doha Declaration involve 
important questions of international law that should not be determined by 
USTR itself. 
As described at length in the analysis of the 2009 and 2010 Reports 
below, the written decisions of USTR are exceedingly vague. One of the 
marks of a non-arbitrary administrative process is that there are set 
standards being applied, which can then be appealed to the proper policy 
and legal authorities. But it is difficult to know what standards are being 
applied in many places in the Special 301 Report because there are no 
citations to offending laws or policies, no quotation of them and no clear 
recitation of the specific standard being applied. 
2. Continuation of Restrictions on Access to Medicines 
The changes in the substance of the Special 301 report on access to 
medicines issues have been similarly modest.  
To further the administration’s campaign and policy pledges to promote 
access to medicines and global health, a broad coalition of public health 
advocates pressed the administration to adopt a limiting principle in its trade 
policy to “[f]orbid the use of threats and punitive actions . . . in response to 
a country’s use of TRIPS safeguards and flexibilities or refusal to adopt 
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TRIPS-plus measures.”78 In a submission to USTR in the 2010 Special 301 
process, a coalition of global health groups pressed the Administration to 
put this principle into effect through an extension of President Clinton’s 
Executive Order 13155 to all developing countries. The submission argued 
that the policy of the United States should be:  
(a) The United States shall not seek, through Special 301 listing decisions, 
negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or revision of any intellectual 
property or pharmaceutical price or competition regulation of any developing 
country that  
(1) promotes access to affordable pharmaceuticals or medical 
technologies; and 
(2) provides adequate and effective intellectual property protection 
consistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C.  511(d)(15)), the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, the August 30 
Decision system promoting access to generics for countries with inadequate 
local capacity to manufacture medicines, and the WHA Global Strategy and 
Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property. 
These principles have not been embraced by the Obama Administration 
yet. The 2009 and 2010 reports continue to press developing and other 
countries to adopt access to medicines limiting policies in excess of those 
required by TRIPS and in excess of the restrictions placed on the Bush 
Administration’s trade negotiations by the May 2007 New Trade Policy for 
America.  
                                                 
78 ESSENTIAL ACTION, U.S. CIVIL SOCIETY PLATFORM ON TRADE-RELATED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES ISSUES (2009), available at 
http://www.essentialaction.org/access/uploads/IP-MedsPlatformMay2009.pdf (last visited 
Jul. 1, 2010).  
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a. Incomplete Embrace of the Doha Declaration 
The use of Special 301 to pressure countries to adopt TRIPS-plus 
intellectual property rules and other policies that limit access to affordable 
medicines has always stood in uneasy tension with the U.S. commitment to 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.  
The Bush Administration Special 301 reports rhetorically embraced the 
Doha Declaration while avoiding its affirming of the rights of countries to 
use TRIPS flexibilities “to the full” or the commitment that TRIPS “can and 
should” be interpreted and implemented to promote access to medicines for 
all public health problems. In the first Special 301 report after the Doha 
declaration, the U.S. limited its embrace of the Doha declaration to 
situations to “address a major health crisis, like the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-
Saharan Africa.”79 By 2008, the Bush Administration’s stance had 
moderated somewhat, recognizing the application of the Doha Declaration 
to “serious public health problems,” rather than only to “crises.” 
The Obama Administration’s statements on the Doha Declaration are 
slightly broader. The 2009 Report eliminates the qualification “serious” 
from the public health problems Doha was meant to address, explaining: the 
“United States respects a country’s right to protect public health, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”80 For the first time, the 
Report explicitly mentions support for use of compulsory licenses, stating: 
“the United States respects our trading partners’ rights to grant compulsory 
licenses in a manner consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement.”81 The same language is included in the 2010 report.82 These 
                                                 
79 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, 2002 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, at 5 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Special 301 Report]. 
80 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, at 6 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Special 301 Report].. 
81 Id. 
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are much broader categories of public interest concerns than the US has 
previously endorsed. But the Administration still appears intent on avoiding 
the Doha Declaration’s affirming of the rights to use TRIPS flexibilities “to 
the full” and the instruction that TRIPS “can and should” be interpreted and 
implemented to promote public health and access to medicines. A strong 
endorsement of these principles would stand in stark contrast to the many 
TRIPS-plus pressures on medicines issues included in the reports. 
b. Data exclusivity 
The most common objection in the 2009 and 2010 Reports related to 
pharmaceutical policy is a complaint about “lack of protection [in a 
particular country] against unfair commercial use of undisclosed test and 
other data.”83 In 2010, fifteen countries were cited for lack of adequate 
pharmaceutical data protection (Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Turkey, and Vietnam). This number of citations is 
down from 21 countries similarly cited in 2009. 
The vague complaints about lack of data protection, which most 
commonly merely restate the TRIPS article 39.3 requirement, is best 
interpreted as a demand for a new form of pharmaceutical marketing 
monopoly known as “data exclusivity.” The issue arises because of 
                                                                                                                            
82 2010 Special 301 Report, supra, at 12-13. 
83 2009 Special 301 Report, supra, at 17 (noting that each of the ten countries on the 
Priority Watch List is targeted for such a complaint as are ten of the Watch List countries 
and Paraguay, identified as a Section 306 monitoring case. In all but one of the entries 
(Israel), this vague language complaining of unidentified “lack of protection” is used nearly 
verbatim with no explanation of what specifically is inadequate in the country’s laws. For 
the Israel submission, the report specifically states that USTR considers five years of data 
exclusivity to be required, rather than the “effective period” of three to four years provided 
in Israel’s law). 
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requirements that manufacturers must prove the safety, efficacy, and quality 
of medicines through clinical trials or other data. When a generic 
manufacturer subsequently attempts to obtain marketing approval for a 
therapeutically equivalent medicine, it is normally required to prove only 
bioequivalence to the already approved drug. In this way, the generic firm 
relies on the original safety and efficacy data. “Data exclusivity” rules 
delineate a time period in which a generic firm may not rely on the 
originator’s data, thus requiring that the generic product either remain off 
the market or repeat costly and ethically troublesome clinical trials.84 
The TRIPS agreement requires that certain pharmaceutical test data 
submitted to registration authorities be protected from “unfair commercial 
use.”85 Article 39.3’s literal scope is relatively narrow.86 Importantly, 
                                                 
84 See World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for 
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 18th WMA General Assemb. Art. 20 (Jun. 
1964) (stating “[p]hysicians may not participate in a research study involving human 
subjects unless they are confident that the risks involved have been adequately assessed 
and can be satisfactorily managed. Physicians must immediately stop a study when the 
risks are found to outweigh the potential benefits or when there is conclusive proof of 
positive and beneficial results.” Repetition of clinical trials on human subjects would 
therefore violate international ethical standards for clinical trials, which forbid doctors to 
continue experiments on humans “when there is conclusive proof of positive and beneficial 
results.”); see also Global Strategy and Plan of Action (committing to “[p]romote ethical 
principles for clinical trials involving human beings as a requirement of registration of 
medicines and health-related technologies, with reference  to the Declaration of Helsinki, 
and other appropriate texts, on ethical principles for medical research involving human 
subjects, including good clinical practice guidelines.”). 
85 TRIPS Art. 39.3 specifically states:  
Members, when requiring as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new 
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the 
origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data 
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countries have great leeway in defining what use or reliance on test data 
may be “unfair” or “commercial.”87 A World Health Organization paper 
advises that “[c]ountries are not obligated under Article 39.3 to confer 
exclusive rights on the originator of marketing approval data,”88 and most 
traditional uses of registration data “to assess the efficacy and toxicity of a 
pharmaceutical or agrochemical product is not a commercial use subject to 
Article 39.3.” 89  
Countries can meet their obligations to protect against “unfair commercial 
use” under Article 39.3 by barring “dishonest” uses of test data. This would 
require, for example, proscribing situations in which a competitor obtains the 
results of testing data through fraud, breach of confidence or other “dishonest” 
practices, and uses them to submit an application for marketing approval for 
its own benefit. It would also apply in cases where the government provides 
access to undisclosed testing data in order to provide an advantage to a firm 
which did not produce them or share their cost.90 
The practice of providing a form of exclusivity for pharmaceutical test 
                                                                                                                            
against unfair commercial use. 
86 Test data must be protected only if: (1) national authorities require its submission; 
(2) it is undisclosed, not already public, (as many clinical trial results in the U.S. are by 
virtue of state and local clinical trial registry laws); and (3) it concerns a new chemical 
entity, i.e., the undisclosed data is “the result of significant investment,” proof which could 
be required. 
87 See Correa, supra, at 41-47. 
88 See Correa, supra  at x. 
89 Correa, supra at 5. 
90 Correa, supra at 5. See also Sisule F. Musungu & Cecilia Oh, The Use of TRIPS By 
Developing Countries: Can they Promote Access to Medicine?, Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, Study 4C, 65-67 (Aug. 2005); Judit Rius-
Sanjuan, James Love & Robert Weissman, Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data: A 
Policy Proposal, Consumer Project on Technology (Nov. 2006), available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/data/CPTech-Test-Data.pdf. 
36 Special 301  
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
data originates with the Hatch Waxman Act in the U.S. The Act included a 
political compromise by providing an avenue for generic firms to register 
based on originator safety and efficacy data, but prohibiting such reliance in 
the first five years after the data is filed. In the EU, data exclusivity periods 
were later enacted that can run as long as eleven years.91 These periods 
operate independently of any period of patent exclusivity, and in the EU 
have been interpreted to be impervious to compulsory licensing, even in a 
health emergency.92   
Most countries in the world do not follow exclusivity rules.93 In such 
countries, the only marketing monopoly companies receive is through the 
patent system rather than the registration system.94 
USTR has adopted a legal interpretation of TRIPS that Article 39.3 
requires data exclusivity similar to the U.S. or EU. This interpretation is in 
                                                 
91 In the U.S., the data originator obtains five years of data exclusivity for a new 
chemical entity and an additional three years for marketing approvals of new uses, new 
formulations, or new dosages that require the submission of new clinical trial data.  In 
Europe, the data originator obtains ten years of data exclusivity and can obtain an 
additional, one-time-only one-year extension for registering a significant improvement. 
See, e.g., Brook Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid – Taming Data Exclusivity 
and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 303-44 (2008). 
92 European Commission Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry, Letter from 
Martin Teberger, Head of Unit for Consumer Goods to the European Generic 
Pharmaceuticals Association (Feb. 20, 2006), available at 
wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/eu02202006 (stating “[t]he European pharmaceutical legislation 
does not foresee any exception . . . in case of emergency situation or in case a compulsory 
patent license has been granted by an EU Member State”).  
93 See Musungu & Oh, supra at 65-67 (surveying countries).  
94 Cf. Correa, supra, at xi (“This approach emphasizes that the registration of products 
should not erect barriers to otherwise legitimate competition. It holds, instead, that the 
registration system should promote price competition and access to more affordable 
medicines.”). 
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direct conflict with the negotiating history of the TRIPS agreement, during 
which the U.S. proposal to require that pharmaceutical test data be 
“reserved for the exclusive use of the registrant for a reasonable period”95 
was amended out of the final text.96 Despite this rejection of a data 
exclusivity requirement by TRIPS negotiators, both PhRMA and the USTR 
have argued that Art. 39.3 of TRIPS requires countries to implement data 
exclusivity regimes.97  
Data exclusivity can have particularly harmful effects in developing 
countries. In many developing countries, drug companies lack patents 
because they were never sought or granted. In such circumstances, data 
exclusivity grants a marketing monopoly in the absence of patent 
protection. Another problem is that companies often register their products 
in developing countries very late, focusing instead on the wealthy markets. 
                                                 
95 See Correa, supra at 53. 
96 CARLOS CORREA & ABDULQAWI YUSUF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (1998); DANIEL GERVAIS, TRIPS 
AGREEMENT - DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 182-183 (1998)..   
97 See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Special 301 
Submission 2009 [hereinafter 2009 PhRMA Submission], available at 
http://www.ipophil.gov.ph/ipenforcement/phrma_submission.pdf (stating that TRIPS 
requires “a data exclusivity regime which prevents regulatory authorities from prematurely 
allowing generic producers to rely on or otherwise use the originator’s proprietary data to 
gain approval of copies of the originator’s drug,” and cannot be met through); USTR 2003 
Special 301 Report at 4-5 (“the TRIPS Agreement recognizes that the original applicant 
should be entitled to a period of exclusivity during which second-comers may not rely on 
the data that the innovative company has created to obtain approval for their copies of the 
product”). Elsewhere, USTR has proclaimed that “any other” interpretation of Article 39.3 
“would be inconsistent with logic and the negotiating history of the provision.” Office of 
the General Counsel, USTR, The Protection of Undisclosed Test Data in Accordance with 
TRIPS Article 39.3 (May 1995), available at  
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh3009ae/11.html).  
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When this is the case, data exclusivity can extend monopoly periods past 
the point at which the medicine is subject to full competition in the U.S.98    
The Bush Administration’s press for data exclusivity was subject to 
vociferous opposition. One congressional report concluded that the 
consequences of data exclusivity provisions “are the exact opposite of those 
intended by the Doha Declaration.”99 Members of the House of 
Representatives criticized USTR’s pressure on Guatemala and other 
CAFTA members to adopt data exclusivity, explaining that the pressure 
“interferes directly” with “the central purpose of the Doha Declaration.”100 
The 2007 New Trade Policy for America limited data exclusivity provisions 
in pending trade agreements, requiring that exclusivity “not preclude FTA 
countries from taking measures to protect public health” and that 
exclusivity periods run concurrently with exclusivity in the U.S. The World 
Health Organization’s 2006 Report of the Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health “recommends that 
developing countries should not impose restrictions for the use of, or 
reliance on, data from pharmaceutical development tests in ways that would 
exclude fair competition or impede the use of flexibilities” in TRIPS.101  
The USTR’s use of Special 301 to push its interpretation of Article 39.3 
                                                 
98 Waxman Report, supra, at 7. 
99 Id.   
100 Letter from Members of the House Ways and Means Committee, United States 
House of Representatives, to Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank (Jan. 26, 2005), 
available at 
http://www.cpath.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/congressguatemalatest-data-
secrecy-letter1-05.pdf.   
101 World Health Organization Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation 
and Public Health.  Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights. (2006) at 
126.   
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on developing countries displays the inadequacy of Special 301 as a just 
and neutral adjudicative process and highlights the reason why it violates 
the WTO. Countries cannot have the right to list and sanction other 
countries for violating their own interpretation of the WTO accord. The 
proper route for pressing TRIPS complaints is through dispute resolution. 
c. Registration and Patent Linkage 
The 2010 report indicates a policy change in the Obama administration 
on the issue of linkage.  
"Linkage" refers to requirements that FDA-like marketing authorities 
not register generic copies of medicines for which there is a patent claimed 
by a supplier. This is an added enforcement process favored by patent 
holders. It permits them to use patent claims to block marketing of products 
without the need to sue the alleged infringer in courts to enforce the patent 
rights. The rule in the US has led to "ever-greening" - where marketing 
monopolies are extended with new (often baseless) applications for patents 
that may be used to prohibit marketing approval of generics unless and until 
the generic firm successfully challenges the patent in court.102 Evergreening 
problems are likely to be more pronounced in developing countries that lack 
the rigorous patent examination process and other regulatory resources and 
                                                 
102 Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An 
FTC Study, (2002). See also Robert Weissman, The Evergreen Patent System: 
Pharmaceutical Company Tactics to Extend Patent Protections, MULTINATIONAL 
MONITOR, June 2002; Marc Kaufman, Drug Firms’ Deals Allowing Exclusivity -- Makers 
of Generics Being Paid to Drop Patent Challenges, FTC Review Finds, THE WASH. POST, 
Apr. 25, 2006; Federal Trade Commission, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade 
Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003: Summary of Agreements Filed in FY 2005 -- A Report by the Bureau of 
Competition (2006), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf. 
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expertise of the U.S.103 TRIPS does not require countries to implement 
linkage rules. 
The 2007 New Trade Policy for America called on the USTR to 
“eliminate [the] requirement that a drug regulatory agency withhold 
approval of a generic until it can certify that no patent will be violated if the 
generic were marketed,” calling instead for the U.S. to work to “strengthen 
and expedite judicial processes in countries to ensure patent rights of 
innovative companies are respected.” Nevertheless, USTR continued to 
demand linkage rules through Special 301.  
In 2009, a lack of linkage was the second most cited medicines-related 
complaint in Special 301 (after data exclusivity). The complaint was 
normally framed as an alleged failure by countries to “implement an 
effective system to prevent the issuance of marketing approvals for 
unauthorized copies of patented pharmaceutical products.”104 A nearly 
identical complaint was raised against twelve countries in the 2009 report. 
In 2010, the number of countries cited for similar problems was reduced 
to eight – Chile, Pakistan, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Malaysia and Mexico. Of these, Chile, Columbia and the Dominican 
Republic are signatories to free trade agreements with the US that already 
require linkage. The other countries have no outside obligations to enforce 
linkage rules. 
Perhaps more importantly, the language used to define the complaint 
shifted. Instead of requesting a “system to prevent the issuance of marketing 
approvals,” as in 2009, the 2010 report asks for “an effective system to 
address patent issues expeditiously in connection with applications to 
                                                 
103 Waxman Report, supra, at 9. 
104 2009 Special 301 Report, supra, at 17. 
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market pharmaceutical products.”105 To be consistent with the 2007 New 
Trade Policy, such a system could be an effective court adjudication process 
for the enforcement of patent rights. But so interpreted, the 301 complaint 
becomes incredibly vague. Are we to interpret the 2010 Report as meaning 
that the eight countries identified have no system to effectively resolve 
patent infringement claims? As is the norm in the Special 301 report, the 
complaint is so vague and without citation or explanation as to leave the 
reader with very little idea as to what is in fact being complained about.  
d. Restrictions on Compulsory Licensing 
Compulsory licensing is perhaps the most important flexibility in the 
TRIPS agreement. Despite the express mention of respect for the rights of 
countries to issue compulsory licenses in the 2010 report, the Obama 
Administration is continuing to use Special 301 to pressure countries to 
reduce the use of this important tool to promote public health. 
A compulsory license is a government-issued license to one or more 
competitors permitting entry in the market upon payment of adequate 
royalties to the patent holder. The Doha Declaration affirms the broad right 
of all countries to use compulsory licenses to promote access to medicines, 
stating that each country “has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”  
The Obama Administration is continuing to use Special 301 to pressure 
Thailand over its use of compulsory licenses. In 2007, Thailand was 
elevated to the Priority Watch List (PWL) in large part for its 
announcement of compulsory licenses for excessively priced medicines 
needed to treat AIDS and heart disease. The official U.S. complaint was not 
about the license per se, but rather an alleged failure of Thai government to 
“engage openly and transparently with the companies that developed the 
                                                 
105  2010 Special 301 Report, supra, at 30. 
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drugs that are at issue.”106 In 2009, Thailand was kept on the PWL, noting 
concerns about “the uncertainty created by the previous Government’s 
policies concerning the issuance of compulsory licenses on patented 
pharmaceutical products.”107 Thailand remained on the 2010 PWL as well. 
Although use of the words “compulsory license” was eliminated from the 
entry, the issue was clearly indicated through the call for Thailand “to 
engage in a meaningful and transparent manner with all relevant 
stakeholders, including owners of intellectual property rights, as it considers 
ways to address Thailand’s public health challenges.”108  
Other countries were also targeted for pressure on the use of compulsory 
licenses in the 2010 report. China was singled out for complaints about “the 
possible use of compulsory licensing for essential patents included in 
national standards,” and for concerns about “the scope of and procedures 
related to compulsory licensing.”109 And the report noted that “the United 
States will continue to monitor recent developments concerning compulsory 
licensing of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products in 
Ecuador.”110   
e. Patent Extensions 
Under TRIPS, WTO members are required to grant patents for a period 
of 20 years from the time the patent is filed. This period takes into account 
the known delays in regulatory processes. But the U.S. has long used 
Special 301 to pressure countries to extend patent terms for delays in 
                                                 
106 Letter from U.S. Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce to His Excellency, General Surayud 
Chulanont, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, July 20, 2007, available at 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-August/011610.html  
107 2009 Special 301 Report, supra, at 21. 
108 2010 Special 301 Report, supra, at 28. 
109 2010 Special 301 Report, supra, at 21-22. 
110 2010 Special 301 Report, supra, at 31. 
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granting patents or marketing approvals for medicines. In response to the 
public health concerns with such extensions,111 the 2007 New Trade Policy 
demanded that the U.S. “[e]liminate [the] requirement that an FTA country 
extend the term of a patent on a pharmaceutical product for delays in the 
patent and regulatory approval process,” and instead “ensure expeditious 
patent and regulatory approval.”112 In 2009 and 2010, no developing 
country was targeted for a failure to grant patent extensions to compensate 
for regulatory delays. But Israel was cited for lack of patent extensions in 
both reports.113  
f. Patentability criteria 
One of the key flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement is the ability of a 
country to decide for itself what inventions qualify for patents for being 
sufficiently “new,” involving an “inventive step” and being “capable of 
industrial application.”114 In pharmaceuticals, the definition of these terms 
can determine whether a country grants patents for new uses or 
formulations of existing products that are already known. The grant of such 
patents is controversial between countries and among experts and there are 
no provisions in TRIPS restricting country flexibility in making these basic 
policy decisions.  
The 2009 and 2010 Reports single out Brazil, India and Philippines for 
                                                 
111 See Waxman Report, supra, at 8 (criticizing patent extensions which “can work to 
delay access to low-cost generic drugs in developing nations”).  
112 New Trade Policy for America, p.2, available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Media/eNewsLetter/5-11-
07/07%2005%2010%20New%20Trade%20Policy%20Outline.pdf 
113 See 2009 Special 301 Report, supra (requesting Israel “amend its laws to increase 
the effective patent term extension given to pharmaceutical products to compensate for 
delays in the regulatory approval process.”) 
114 TRIPS, supra, Art. 27(1). 
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laws that ban patents on polymorphs (i.e. new forms) and new uses of 
known inventions.115 These complaints press countries to grant patents on a 
larger range of inventions than TRIPS requires and thereby would limit 
access to affordable medicines in each country. In the case of India, the 
claim is particularly troublesome because that country is the largest supplier 
of generic medicines in the world. The more patents India grants, the less 
possibility there will be to find a source of generic supply for other 
countries.   
g. Vague definitions of “counterfeit” pharmaceuticals 
The 2009 and 2010 Reports list concerns about “counterfeit” 
pharmaceuticals in several countries. But it is unclear what definition of 
“counterfeit” is being used. Under TRIPS, “counterfeit” has a particular 
meaning. It means a product that willfully deceives consumers by using an 
identical mark to the originator.116 It is not correctly applied to an allegedly 
unauthorized generic version of a patented product or to lesser forms of 
trademark infringement that do not use identical marks.  
The reports frequently allege concerns with “unauthorized use of bulk 
active pharmaceutical ingredients” by manufacturers in Brazil, China, and 
India. But the reports fail to identify who determined that these uses were 
unauthorized? The proper mechanism for enforcing a patent and 
determining if a particular use is in fact a violation is through civil 
litigation. The USTR cites no such litigation. It appears to be simply taking 
                                                 
115 See 2010 Report, supra,  at 26 (India), 29 (Brazil), 36 (Philippines). 
116 TRIPS, supra, Art, 51 n.14. “For the purposes of this Agreement: (a) ‘counterfeit 
trademark goods’ shall mean any goods, including packaging, bearing without 
authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect 
of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a 
trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question 
under the law of the country of importation. 
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industry complaints as fact. 
In all references to “counterfeit” medicines, USTR should ensure that 
the U.S. position respects the legitimacy of generic medicines and clearly 
distinguishes generic equivalents from actual trademark counterfeits. And 
when it makes accusations about violations of patent law, such as targeting 
“unauthorized uses” of patents, it should back those claims up with proof.  
h. Vague Criticisms of Pharmaceutical Patent Policy 
The 2009 and 2010 reports make many vague allegations that a patent 
law in a particular country is “weak” or otherwise deficient, with little 
indication as to what specifically is wrong with the country’s system.117 It is 
impossible to engage with comments that are so vague. Basic due process 
concerns mandate that countries listed on watch lists have notice for the 
grounds for their listing so that they can challenge the factual and legal 
basis for USTR’s claims. 
The 2009 Report lists the Philippines on the Watch List and comments: 
The United States is troubled by the amendments to the patent provisions 
in the Philippines Intellectual Property Law only as they apply to 
pharmaceuticals. The amendment significantly weakens patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products.  
There is no citation to the law or what part of it USTR opposes. There is 
no ban in TRIPS from having patent law requirements that apply 
specifically to pharmaceuticals. As the WTO panel noted in the Canada – 
Patent Protection decision,118 TRIPS only bans unjustified discrimination 
by field of technology, not mere differentiation. And the Doha Declaration 
                                                 
117 See 2010 Special 301 Report, supra, at 24 (Algeria cited for “weak” patents); 26 
(India cited for needing “stronger” protection). See 2009 Report at 31 (citing 
“shortcomings in Paraguay’s patent regime”). 
118 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114 
(Mar. 17, 2000). 
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specifically requires countries to promote access to medicines for all. There 
is nothing in the recent amendments to the Philippines patent law that 
violates the TRIPS agreement. The new law puts in place model TRIPS-
compliant compulsory licensing and government use provisions, excludes 
minor new uses or new forms of existing medicines from patent protection, 
authorizes TRIPS-compliant parallel importation, and adopts recognized 
limitations to patent rights, such as limitations for experimental use.  
USTR should identify with specificity the provisions it opposes so that 
more informed response can be made to its allegations. This appears to be 
an instance where USTR is sanctioning a country for putting in place all of 
the TRIPS flexibilities protected by the Doha Declaration. 
i. Enforcement Requirements 
In many instances in the 2009 and 2010 Reports, USTR presses 
countries to adopt TRIPS-plus intellectual property enforcement procedures 
that could limit access to medicines. Particularly troubling are the many 
vague complaints about the need to give border officials (and others) the 
ability to confiscate suspected infringing products without court orders or 
other procedural checks. These allegations are not specifically limited to 
trademark counterfeit or commercial-scale copyright infringements. 
Examples include the passages for Canada, Thailand, Belarus, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Seizures of legitimate 
medicines by border officials have become a massive problem for access to 
medicines around the globe, particularly through the so-called “Dutch 
seizure” cases in Europe.119 The U.S. should not be encouraging border 
                                                 
119 Since late 2008, customs officials in the Netherlands, Germany and France have 
seized at least twenty shipments of legitimate generic medicines. Of the shipments, 
nineteen were legally manufactured and exported from India and intended for developing 
countries where they could be legally imported. Patents did not exist on the medicines in 
either the country of origin or destination. These shipments were seized as a result of 
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officials to confiscate products that allegedly violate patents. Patent 
violations cannot be identified by sight by border officials or police. The 
reason we enforce patents through complex civil proceedings is that such 
proceedings are necessary to avoid wrongful confiscations. For medicines, 
wrongful confiscations harm more than economies (which itself threatens 
social welfare), they directly threaten the lives of people who depend on 
uninterrupted supplies of the medicines.120    
j. Restrictions on evidence-based reimbursement programs  
In the 2009 and 2010 Reports, the USTR included sections on 
“Supporting Pharmaceutical [and Medical Device] Innovation” that 
promotes only one narrow pro-innovation policy: convincing other 
countries to abandon regulatory and reimbursement programs that restrain 
the high cost of patented prescription drugs. The Reports single out all 
OECD members and specifically mention Finland, France, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Poland for 
administering “unreasonable . . . reference pricing or other potentially unfair 
                                                                                                                            
national implementation of an EU regulation that empowers border officials to classify and 
seize medicines as counterfeits if the customs official determines (often at the direction of 
pharmaceutical companies) that the medicines violate territorial patents of the relevant EU 
country. The IP standards of the EU countries have been applied to medicines in-transit 
even though these medicines are not intended for domestic consumption in the EU. 
Medicines that were seized included a cardiovascular disease medicine (Losartan) intended 
for Brazil and a key anti-retroviral medicine (Abacavir) purchased by the Clinton 
Foundation and intended for Nigeria. Without modifying or eliminating the EU regulation 
(or worse, expanding the regulation through new trade agreements), medicines supplied 
through U.S. foreign assistance programs - such as PEPFAR – could be similarly affected. 
120 In the case of AIDS and other illnesses, an interruption in supply of medicines can 
lead to drug resistance – which harms not only the patient but the greater society effort to 
combat the disease. 
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reimbursement policies.”121  
As in other areas, the use of Special 301 to target reimbursement 
programs appears linked to a broader international regulatory agenda. Two 
Free Trade Agreements negotiated under the Bush Administration – with 
Australia and Korea – included chapters imposing restrictions on 
pharmaceutical reimbursement programs. During and after the negotiation 
of these agreements, U.S. state officials repeatedly warned USTR and 
Congress that the norms adopted in these agreements, if applied to U.S. 
state governments, would cripple Medicaid programs.122 This is because 
                                                 
121 2010 Special 301 Report, supra, at 14; 2009 Special 301 Report, supra, at 7-8. 
122 See Vermont State Senate Resolution 2006 J.R.S. 50 (urging USTR to “pursue an 
exchange of Interpretive notes” with Australia to formally ensure state Medicaid programs 
would not be covered by Annex 2(c)); Letter from Liz Figueroa and Sheila Kuehl, 
California State Senators, to USTR(Feb. 16, 2005); Letter from National Legislative 
Association on Prescription Drugs, to USTR (May 26, 2005) (warning about the dangers of 
the free trade agreement and asked for a binding interpretation that it did not cover U.S. 
state programs); Letter from Washington Governor Christine Gregoire, (Mar. 13, 2006) 
(expressing concerns over the FTA); Letter from Four Washington State Legislators to the 
Washington State Congressional Delegation (Mar. 2, 2006); Letter from Meg Burton 
Cahill, Arizona State Senator, and Kevin Ryan, Connecticut State Representative, to 
Members of the House Ways and Means Committee Subcommittee on Trade (Mar. 18, 
2007) (stating that legislators are “extremely troubled by, and strongly oppose, USTR’s 
efforts to alter public reimbursement formularies in the Korea FTA”); National Legislative 
Association on Prescription Drug Prices, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of 
the House Committee on Ways and Means, (Mar. 20, 2007) (warning that the language 
applied to Medicaid programs would “give pharmaceutical companies rights to block and 
delay implementation of the most important and proven medicine cost-control tools 
available."); Letter from Ginny Lyons, Vermont State Senator, and Kathleen Keenan, 
Vermont State Representative, to Senators Patrick Leahy and Bernard Sanders, and 
Representative Peter Welsh, (Apr. 18, 2007) (asserting that “Vermont uses a similar 
‘positive list’ approach [as Korea]”). 
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Medicaid programs rely on preferred drug lists to exact lower prices from 
pharmaceutical companies, which operate very similarly to the formularies 
and other programs targeted by the US in other countries. 
TRIPS does not restrict how countries regulate the market power of 
companies that is created by patents. Patents on medicines create 
particularly strong and socially harmful market power because people will 
pay anything they can for life-savings drugs, there often are literally no 
substitutes if a truly innovative medicine is under patent, and the burdens of 
lack of access fall almost exclusively on the poorest people (or, in the U.S., 
the uninsured).   
U.S. state officials appeared at the 2010 Special 301 hearing to “oppose 
the recent and disturbing use of the Special 301 Report to discipline 
effective and non-discriminatory pharmaceutical pricing policies.”123 
Referring to Ambassador Kirk’s expressed “support” for broadening a 
discussion of a proposal by Pfizer for a new international trade agreement to 
“discipline” pharmaceutical reimbursement programs in the U.S. and 
abroad,124 the elected state officials explained that U.S. state reimbursement 
                                                 
123 Testimony of Sean Fiil-Flynn on behalf of the Forum on Democracy and Trade, 
before the interagency hearing for the 2010 Special 301 Review. (March 3, 2010) Available 
at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/forum03032010 
124 See Testimony of Jeff Kindler, Pfizer CEO, before the Senate Finance Committee 
(Jul. 15, 2008), available at 
http://media.pfizer.com/files/news/kindler_testimony_sfc_071508.pdf (last visited on Feb. 
17, 2010). See also, A Discussion with Prof. John Barton, sponsored by PIJIP (Feb. 19, 
2009) available at  wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/barton (last visited on Feb. 17, 2010) (stating 
that the Pfizer proposal includes as “a trade goal the achievement of a sector-specific trade 
agreement” that would ensure that high prices in wealthy countries subsidize lower prices 
for some populations in poor countries. In the rich countries like the U.S., the agreement 
would impose internationally binding restrictions on regulatory authority that would 
“ensure that pricing and reimbursement policies recognize and reward innovation, and to 
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programs “follow the same basic policies and principles of foreign countries 
that USTR seeks to discipline.” The officials warned: “Reciprocal 
enforcement of USTR standards to state programs would obliterate the 
effectiveness of Medicaid pricing programs and threaten the 
administration’s policy goal of reducing the cost of healthcare in this 
country.”125  
The concerns of state officials protesting the use of 301 to criticize 
reimbursement policies had minimal effect. The 2010 report, as in 2009, 
continues to target "unfair" reimbursement policies without describing what 
is unfair about them or how these programs differ from what states now do 
to reduce drug prices. There is nothing in the 301 statute that authorizes 
USTR to pressure or sanction other countries for their pharmaceutical 
reimbursement policies. There is nothing in the report that backtracks from 
Ambassador Kirk's expressed support for a new international trade 
agreement that would "discipline" pharmaceutical pricing programs in 
developed countries such as the U.S. 
D.  Conclusion 
The continuation of the Special 301 program to threaten and sanction 
                                                                                                                            
set disciplines on government practices that undermine incentives for innovation.” The 
proposal would also demand that wealthy country aid programs limit use of generic drugs 
and pay high prices even for distribution in developing countries with no patent protections 
on the drugs).  
125 2010 Special 301 Submission of Groups Representing State Governments, available 
at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/pijip-represents-public-health-and-
states-in-submissions-to-the-united-states-trade-representative. See also, Letter from 
Governor Baldacci to Secretary Sebelius and Ambassador Kirk (Apr. 26, 2010) available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/governor-baldacci-writes-sebelius-on-
special-301 (calling on the administration to “reverse the previous administration's support 
for using trade policy to restrict governmental powers to control medicine prices”). 
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countries for TRIPS-plus intellectual property and pharmaceutical 
regulation policies stands in stark contrast to the principles that the Obama 
Administration states that it espouses. Failure to change course and embrace 
the cause of access to medicines in Special 301 and in the administration’s 
trade policies could trigger legal disputes by countries in the WTO and by 
affected people in international human rights forums. 
Global health groups have developed the outlines of a trade and access 
to medicines agenda that needs to be expanded into a broader campaign.  
First, the Obama Administration should take Executive Order 13155 as 
a starting point and apply its principles to all developing countries. No 
developing country anywhere in the world should be pressed by the U.S. to 
adopt an intellectual property or pharmaceutical regulation policy in excess 
of those required by the WTO accords if the effect will be to  raise prices of 
needed medicines in that country.  
Second, the Administration should undertake an urgent review of 
legislative and policy changes necessary to bring Special 301 into 
compliance with the WTO. Special 301 was created for the explicit purpose 
of unilaterally adjudicating and sanctioning other countries for violation of 
U.S.-determined standards on intellectual property. This purpose cannot 
survive the WTO’s ban on unilateral adjudication of trade disputes.  
Third, the U.S. government should use trade policy to pursue more 
equitable innovation policies. For example, it could encourage our trading 
partners to invest more in public sector R&D, including open source 
projects, and could highlight best practices to promote access to knowledge, 
such as the NIH policies to provide open access to published scholarly and 
scientific research when the research benefited from government funding.   
 
